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 REVIEW ESSAYS
 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
 LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS*
 Stephen S. Golub
 Swarthmore College
 DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMER-
 ICA. By Joel Bergsman and Wayne Edisis. (Washington D.C: World
 Bank, 1988. Pp. 34. $5.00 paper.)
 LA CRISIS DE LA DEUDA LATINOAMERICA FRENTE A LOS PRECEDENTES
 HISTORICOS. By Gonzalo Biggs. (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latino-
 americano, 1987. Pp. 192.)
 LOST PROMISES: DEBT, AUSTERITY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMER-
 ICA. By William L. Canak. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.
 Pp. 244. $3700 cloth, $16.00 paper.)
 THE DEBT THREAT. By Tim Congdon. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
 Pp. 246. $24.95.)
 THE LOAN PUSHERS: THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE INTERNA-
 TIONAL DEBT CRISIS. By William Darity, Jr., and Bobbie L. Horn.
 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988. Pp. 203. $34.95.)
 A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE POOR.
 By Susan George. (New York: Grove Press, 1988. Pp. 292. $1795.)
 MANAGING WORLD DEBT. Edited by Stephany Griffith-Jones. (New York:
 St. Martin's Press, 1988. Pp. 386. $49.95.)
 BETWEEN BAILOUT AND BREAKDOWN: A MODULAR APPROACH TO LATIN
 *1 would like to thank John Caskey, Jonathan Conning, and Stephen Haber for thoughtful
 comments. This essay was completed while I was visiting Yale University.
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 AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS. By William Guttman. (Washington D.C.: Cen-
 ter for Strategic and International Studies, 1989. Pp. 56. $6.95.)
 FOREIGN INVESTMENT, DEBT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMER-
 ICA. Edited by Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar-Carrillo. (New York: St.
 Martin's Press, 1988. Pp. 250. $60.00.)
 LATINAMERICAN DEBT By Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
 Hopkins University Press, 1988. Pp. 258. $32.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.)
 TWO CRISES: LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA, 1929-38 AND 1973-83. By Angus
 Maddison. (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
 opment, 1985. Pp. 105. $14.95 paper.)
 LATIN AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING
 FOR THE FUTURE? Edited by Robert A. Pastor. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
 Rienner Publishers, 1987. Pp. 176. $20.00.)
 NEW APPROACHES TO THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS. By Jeffrey D.
 Sachs. Princeton Essays in International Finance no. 174. Princeton,
 N.J.: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1989. Pp. 50.
 $6.50.)
 DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY Edited by
 Jeffrey D. Sachs. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Pp. 334.
 $13.55 paper.)
 WORLD DEBT: WHO IS TO PAY? By Jacobo Schatan. (London: Zed Books,
 1987 Pp. 126. $35.00 cloth, $9.95 paper.)
 BANKER TO THE THIRD WORLD: U.S. PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN LATIN
 AMERICA, 1900-1986. By Barbara Stallings. (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
 University of California Press, 1987. Pp. 434. $45.00 cloth, $12.95 paper.)
 DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Barbara Stallings
 and Robert Kaufman. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. Pp. 232.
 $29.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.)
 THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT STRATEGY By Knud Erik
 Svendsen. (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1987. Pp.
 123.)
 REKINDLING DEVELOPMENT: MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND THIRD WORLD
 DEBT Edited by Lee A. Tavis. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
 Dame Press, 1988. Pp. 369. $26.95.)
 LATIN AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEBT, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
 FUTURE. By Howard J. Wiarda. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987.
 Pp. 114. $19.95.)
 VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO DEBT RELIEF. By John Williamson. (Wash-
 ington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1988. Pp. 63. $10.95
 paper.)
 Eight years after Mexico announced that it was unable to service its
 foreign debts, the Latin American debt crisis remains one of the central
 problems confronting the international economy. The Brady Plan, an-
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 nounced in 1989, marks a new phase: for the first time, the U.S. govern-
 ment has thrown its weight behind debt relief rather than debt refinanc-
 ing. This change in the stance of U.S. policy reflects the changed realities.
 The dangers of widespread bank insolvencies and world financial col-
 lapse as a result of Latin American defaults have receded, but most Latin
 American economies continue to stagnate or even deteriorate. As Jeffrey
 Sachs, an advisor to a number of Latin American countries, observes:
 "Despite many years of emergency treatment, Latin America's debt crisis
 continues to deepen.... Many countries are now suffering from an
 alarming mix of hyperinflation and hyperdeflation that has not been
 witnessed on such a wide scale since the disastrous experience of Central
 Europe in the 1920s. In many countries, economic instability is so acute
 that it is breeding political instability and threatening democratic govern-
 ments" (New Approaches to Latin America's Debt Crisis, p. 1).
 The underlying causes of this economic disaster in Latin America
 and the appropriate policy responses by debtor and creditor governments
 are still being debated, and the Brady Plan is unlikely to be the final word.
 In recent years, a vast literature on Latin American foreign debt has
 emerged from a wide variety of disciplines and perspectives.' This review
 essay will assess and contrast some of these contributions (most of which
 appeared between 1987 and 1989) in an effort to understand the sources of
 the disagreements and continuing difficulties. The essay will begin with a
 review of historical antecedents of the present debt crisis and will then
 analyze the causes of the current crisis. The following two sections will
 assess economic management of the crisis since 1982 and examine the ways
 in which interaction between politics and economics have influenced the
 strategies and outcomes. The last main section will examine alternative
 proposals for reforming economic policies and financial markets.
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
 Various observers have noted the parallels between the current
 situation and earlier debt crises and have attempted to examine the past so
 as to elucidate the present. Foreign creditors have been lending to Latin
 America for more than one hundred and fifty years. Historical experience
 has clearly invalidated Walter Wriston's infamous statement that sov-
 ereign lending is safe because nations do not go bankrupt. One wonders
 what other lessons Latin American debtors and creditors could have
 learned from history. A number of intriguing questions can be posed.
 How does the nature of the lending boom in the 1970s and the collapse in
 the 1980s compare with earlier periods, particularly the 1920s and 1930s?
 1. Several review essays on Latin American debt and adjustment have recently appeared
 in LARR. See Sachs (1988), Edwards (1989), and Sheahan (1989).
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 Are fluctuations in international capital flows driven by bank "loan push-
 ing" or by debtor "demand pulling"? What were the causes of the de-
 faults, and how were those defaults handled in negotiations between
 creditors and debtors? How does the Latin American experience compare
 with that of other debtor nations? Perhaps most important, does a long
 historical view of international lending indicate that it has been mutually
 beneficial to debtors and creditors, as economic theory suggests it can be?
 If not, what are the systemic sources of failures of international credit
 markets, and what can be done about them?
 Patterns of International Lending and Default
 - In Banker to the Third World, Barbara Stallings presents a compre-
 hensive assessment of U.S. lending to Latin America between 1920 and
 1980, with particular emphasis on comparing the 1920s with the 1970s, the
 two periods of substantial portfolio capital flows. Stallings draws on the
 literature on British capital exports in the nineteenth century as a source
 of hypotheses for examining the U.S. experience. She details the eco-
 nomic and political forces at work in the evolution of international lend-
 ing. In particular, she attempts to sort out the relative role of the U.S.
 supply of loans versus the Latin American demand for borrowing. The
 strengths of Banker to the Third World are its comprehensive data series,
 many of them assembled for the first time, and a carefully nuanced
 empirical analysis of these data. The main weakness is that some of the
 analytical sections are not as clear as they could be, although the overall
 framework is sound.
 Stallings emphasizes the following supply factors: politics, institu-
 tional innovations, savings rates, and attitudes of bankers. On the de-
 mand side, she focuses on "structural linkage," "process linkage," fiscal
 deficits, growth, and demand for credit by other regions. Unfortunately,
 some of these concepts are not completely elucidated, especially "struc-
 tural" and "process" linkages. The idea of structural linkages is based on
 the well-known two-gap theory of shortages of foreign exchange and
 capital in developing countries, but Stallings's discussion is a little confus-
 ing. For example, she writes, "Both structural linkages imply a potential
 need for foreign capital. The capital goods linkage will actually require a
 foreign capital inflow only if a current-account deficit exists" (p. 167). But
 a current-account deficit can only exist if financing is available, and
 consequently, her distinction is not helpful. The concept of "process
 linkage" is vague as well. It would also be helpful to situate the bilateral
 financial relationship between the United States and Latin America in
 terms of the worldwide flow of funds. In these areas, Banker to the Third
 World suffers from not having a more clearly articulated analytical frame-
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 work, although the basic distinction between demand "pull" and supply
 "push" factors is sound and useful.
 Stallings attempts to sort out the effects of supply and demand
 factors in a variety of overlapping ways and arrives at balanced and
 convincing conclusions. She examines long-run trends and short-term
 fluctuations and provides statistical analyses as well as case studies. She
 notes that a number of authors such as Charles Kindleberger, Hyman
 Minsky, and most recently William Darity and Bobbie Horn (reviewed in
 this essay) stress the role of supply factors, particularly the irrational
 swings between optimism and pessimism in the financial markets. Stal-
 lings's analysis reveals the importance of these supply factors but also
 includes the central role of demand. She characterizes the period between
 1900 and 1930 as experiencing increases of both supply and demand for
 loans, with the demand shift being somewhat greater, whereas between
 1954 and 1980, supply and demand both shifted substantially, with the
 supply increase becoming dominant. Stallings arrives at these conclu-
 sions by examining the variations of the interest premium on Latin Ameri-
 can loans compared with domestic U.S. loans and the size of capital
 movements, using a simple but useful supply and demand framework.
 She offers a detailed statistical analysis of capital flows in the 1920s and
 1970s, providing additional evidence that Latin American borrowers were
 more credit-constrained in the 1920s than in the 1970s. The rise in loan
 supply in the 1970s is attributed primarily to innovations in the financial
 markets (the Eurocurrency markets discovered Latin America) and the
 OPEC surplus of savings. Stallings also provides a detailed study of Peru,
 which corroborates and complements her statistical analysis. She shows
 how the August Leguia government was avid for loans and actively
 sought out the bankers in the early 1920s, with the bankers taking the
 offensive in "pushing" loans from 1924 to 1928. A similar pattern emerged
 in the late 1960s and 1970s, with Peru initially credit-constrained followed
 by a period of bankers competing to provide additional loans to Peru.
 Stallings notes, 'At least in the Peruvian case, the idea of passive govern-
 ments being 'forced' to accept loans so that the banks could make profits
 is quite misleading. In both the 1920s and 1970s, Peruvian governments
 wanted to borrow for both political and economic reasons" (p. 290).
 Stallings concludes that history reveals a pattern of shortsighted-
 ness by both borrowers and lenders, with a surprising lack of historical
 memory of previous difficulties. In the 1920s and 1970s, lending to Latin
 America began cautiously but escalated into a full-scale speculative boom,
 with great carelessness exhibited by bankers as well as borrowers. Banker
 to the Third World is very useful in showing how all parties to the loans are
 responsible for the pattern and magnitude of international lending, in-
 cluding those who establish the contexts in which loans are arranged and
 renegotiated, namely policymakers in creditor countries. History reveals
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 the manifest irrationality of the boom and busts cycles of international
 lending to Latin America, but attempts to find a single scapegoat for debt-
 servicing difficulties are usually oversimplified.
 Although Stallings uses the British capital exports of the nine-
 teenth century as a source of hypotheses, she does not provide a detailed
 comparison of the British and American experiences. Stallings cannot be
 faulted for this omission because her objective is more narrowly defined,
 but the contrasts seem to be quite dramatic (Fishlow 1985). The magni-
 tudes of borrowing and lending in relation to economic magnitudes such
 as the gross national products of the debtor and creditor governments
 were much greater in the nineteenth century than during the 1970s and
 1980s. Also, Fishlow (1985) argues that nineteenth-century debt-servicing
 difficulties were handled more equitably and rationally then than in the
 1930s and 1980s. The earlier British experience seems to suggest that the
 catastrophic experiences of Latin America in the twentieth century reflect
 particular conditions rather than the intrinsic flaws of private interna-
 tional lending.
 Historical precedents are discussed further in two chapters of
 Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, edited by Jeffrey Sachs
 (other parts of which will be reviewed subsequently). These two chapters
 typify the excellent quality and originality of the research in this collec-
 tion, which contains abbreviated versions of longer articles published
 separately in Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance in three
 volumes, not all of which had appeared at the time this review was
 undertaken. The abbreviated versions are detailed and self-contained
 enough that many readers will not need to refer to the longer versions,
 although specialists will wish to consult the longer versions of articles of
 interest to them. Peter Lindert and Peter Morton examine the repayment
 record of sovereign debt over wide geographical and time spans. They
 note that some regions seem more prone to default than others. Latin
 America and Eastern Europe have long histories of repeated defaults,
 while Western Europe and Asia east of the Persian Gulf have almost never
 defaulted. Lindert and Morton examine the rates of return realized by
 British and American investors on their bond holdings in selected Latin
 American and other countries from 1850 to 1970. It is interesting to
 observe that historical average rates of return on foreign investments
 tended to exceed domestic rates on U.S. and British government securi-
 ties, even for some Latin American countries with histories of default.
 This evidence suggests that foreign investors were at least partially com-
 pensated for the riskiness of international lending. Even more surprising,
 bonds issued between 1850 and 1914 had lower rates of return than those
 issued between 1915 and 1945, despite the experience of the Depression.
 Lindert and Morton also examine the degree to which defaulters
 were punished by subsequent credit embargoes and trade restrictions.
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 They find no evidence of any differential treatment of defaulters relative to
 nondefaulters. Barry Eichengreen's chapter focuses on foreign lending by
 the United States between 1920 and 1955. He observes that reputation
 appeared to be significant in the pricing of foreign bonds but finds little
 evidence that risk premia reflected economic performance. Furthermore,
 like Lindert and Morton, he finds no evidence of discriminatory treatment
 of defaulters through loss of future access to credit. Following the defaults
 of the Depression, all sovereign borrowers had reduced access to new
 credits, not just those that had defaulted.2 The results found by Eichen-
 green and Lindert and Morton support the view that there are elements of
 systemic irrationality in the booms and busts of foreign lending. One
 example is the pattern of repeated defaults by some countries and the
 failure of creditors to punish selectively, although the situation was by no
 means entirely negative from the standpoint of long-run rates of return
 on foreign loans.
 Adjustment to Crises
 Angus Maddison's Two Crises provides a masterful overview of the
 periods from 1929 to 1938 and 1973 to 1983, focusing on the experiences of
 Latin America and Asia in a turbulent world economy. In less than one
 hundred lucid pages, Maddison characterizes the overarching features of
 these periods and describes the experiences of a number of individual
 countries. He shows that the external shocks hitting the developing coun-
 tries were much harsher in the earlier period. The Depression of the 1930s
 was transmitted violently from industrial to peripheral countries, while
 the major shocks of the 1970s were the oil price increases, which ema-
 nated from the periphery itself and benefited at least some oil-exporting
 developing countries. The decline in industrial country output was much
 greater in the 1930s than in the later period, making the drop in external
 demand for developing countries' exports also correspondingly greater.
 Contrary to the current conventional wisdom about the merits of
 outward orientation, Maddison demonstrates that inward-looking pol-
 icies served Latin America well in the 1930s.3 Almost all Latin American
 countries defaulted on their foreign debts and adopted import-substitution
 industrialization policies during the Great Depression. Although perhaps
 partially unintended, a number of countries adopted de facto Keynesian
 policies to stimulate aggregate demand through government spending,
 2. The failure of creditors to impose selective sanctions can be understood in game-theoretic
 terms. Creditors may not find it in their own interest to carry out sanctions even if they
 threaten to do so. Furthermore, group coordination problems may arise in enforcing punish-
 ment. See Krugman (1985) for a general discussion of this point.
 3. Dfaz Alejandro (1983) makes the same point.
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 even though Keynes's General Theory advocating such policies had not yet
 been published. For example, Brazil's coffee price supports served to
 stabilize real incomes of producers and had Keynesian multiplier effects
 on the rest of the economy. By contrast, those countries in Asia that were
 European colonies (like India and Indonesia) fared poorly due to the
 deflationary policies and full debt servicing that were imposed by British
 and Dutch colonial authorities. Japanese colonies like Korea and Taiwan
 benefited from the more expansionary approach favored by Japan.
 As will be discussed later in this review, the favorable experience of
 Latin America relative to Asia in the 1930s was reversed in the 1970s and
 1980s. Maddison points out that economic policy was far from homoge-
 neous in Latin America in the 1970s, but he notes some shared weak-
 nesses deriving from the "common institutional heritage which includes a
 very unequal distribution of landed property, weak fiscal structures which
 often rely on inflation as a revenue instrument, and a tradition of military-
 bureaucratic authoritarianism which strengthens belief in government
 control rather than the price mechanism" (p. 53). The extreme swings of
 economic policy have undermined long-run credibility of Latin American
 governments. By contrast, Asia's outstanding performance throughout
 the 1970s and 1980s reflect enlightened and farsighted economic policies
 that focus on raising investment and improving efficiency through open-
 ing to international trade.
 Unfortunately, Maddison does not attempt to resolve a fundamen-
 tal question raised by his analysis: why was Latin America's economic
 performance relatively good in the 1930s and so poor in the 1980s? In
 particular, if default and inward orientation were appropriate policy re-
 sponses in the 1930s, why were they not appropriate in the 1980s? In view
 of the great costs of austerity in Latin America and the successful experi-
 ence with default in the 1930s, the default option is again arguably the best
 choice from the standpoint of the standard of living of Latin Americans.
 Although Maddison argues briefly that outward-oriented policies are
 more feasible and desirable in the 1980s, a full analysis of this issue is
 missing from his otherwise excellent book.4 This omission probably re-
 flects the fact that Two Crises was written in 1984, before the chronic nature
 of the debt crisis became fully apparent. Indeed, readers can see with the
 hindsight of the 1990s that Maddison was somewhat overoptimistic in his
 concluding chapter about the resolution of the debt crisis. Nonetheless, he
 has provided an extremely useful overview of a large span of history and
 geography.
 In La crisis de la deuda latinoamerica frente a los precedentes historicos,
 4. The failure of Latin American debtors to negotiate more favorable deals remains one of
 the puzzles of the 1980s and is atypical of the history of international lending, as is discussed
 subsequently.
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 Gonzalo Biggs looks at historical precedents of the current crisis from an
 unabashedly Latin American perspective. He argues powerfully that the
 current situation is historically unique in terms of the unfair burden of
 adjustment and the consequent costs to the debtors. As will be discussed
 subsequently in this review, a near consensus has emerged that the
 resource transfers exacted from the debtors between 1982 and 1987 were
 excessive and unsustainable. The originality of Biggs's treatment lies in
 his analysis of the current crisis in light of the past: "The summary
 examination of historical precedents . .. demonstrates that in absolutely
 all international financial crises, the creditors and their governments had
 to assume an important part of the losses on their loans and investments.
 The sole exception to this rule has been the current Latin American
 experience. . . " (p. 28, my translation).
 The fundamental reason for this outcome, according to Biggs, has
 been the unyielding stance of creditor governments, especially the United
 States, in support of their own financial institutions. Under the smoke
 screen of free-market ideology, creditor governments have adopted ener-
 getic policies whenever their own interests or those of the banks were
 threatened. Biggs argues that such policies are morally indefensible be-
 cause the banks and creditor governments bear a large share of the
 responsibility for the current situation. He goes so far as to suggest that
 an ulterior motive of U.S. policies favoring liberalization and privatization
 has been to undermine the sovereignty of Latin American governments.
 Biggs's historical overview distinguishes two types of defaults:
 repudiations for political reasons and inability to pay due to economic
 hardships. He argues that an unwritten historical rule is that creditor
 sanctions are justified in the case of political repudiations but not in the
 case of economic defaults, although he notes that considerations of power
 have often superseded these norms. The cases of economic default cov-
 ered by Biggs include the Latin American defaults of the 1820s and the
 1930s as well as German reparations and Allied war debts in the interwar
 period. The political repudiations consist of the Mexican imperial debt in
 the 1860s, the Southern states of the United States between 1842 and the
 1870s, and the Russian imperial debt. Each case is documented, discussed
 concisely, and compared with the current situation.
 Biggs analyzes the evolution of the roles of Latin American govern-
 ments and international law in conflicts with foreign creditors. In the
 early years of independence, Latin American governments responded
 weakly to foreign government interventions in their domestic affairs.
 Paraguayan diplomat Carlos Calvo initiated a decisive break around 1870,
 however. The Calvo doctrine asserted that Latin American governments
 were not responsible for the losses of foreign creditors due to internal
 disturbances and civil wars in Latin America and that "European govern-
 ments must apply the same norms in their relations with Latin American
 183
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 governments as they do among themselves" (p. 76). The Calvo doctrine
 was widely adopted in Latin America, and Biggs praises Calvo effusively
 as one of the great figures in nineteenth-century international relations.
 Biggs speculates that some interventions of the World Bank and the
 International Monetary Fund would have been rejected by Calvo as
 violations of Latin American sovereignty. Luis Maria Drago, Argentine
 foreign minister at the turn of the century, carried Latin American inde-
 pendence a step further by asserting the illegitimacy of using force to
 collect foreign debts. The Hague court ruled against Drago in 1904, but
 Biggs argues that the Drago doctrine was influential nonetheless and
 ultimately led to a change in U.S. policies toward Latin America in 1907.
 Biggs observes with regret that agreements on norms governing conflicts
 between creditors and sovereign debtors have never been codified, the
 most rigorous attempt being that of the Preparatory Committee of the
 League of Nations in 1929. The essence of the principles enunciated by
 this committee is that default could be justified in circumstances of finan-
 cial necessity or public interest as long as foreigners did not receive
 adverse discriminatory treatment (p. 89).
 Biggs goes on to analyze particular crises in detail. Because of
 space limitations, my comments will be limited to the cases of the U.S.
 Southern states and the Latin American defaults of the 1930s. Biggs takes
 some delight in pointing out that the repudiations of some Southern states
 were not caused by the U. S. Civil War but were instead the most egregious
 examples to date of political defaults, flagrantly violating the principles of
 conduct just discussed. As in the case of the Soviet Union's repudiation of
 the Czarist debt, foreign bondholders still have not relinquished their
 claims because of the overtly political nature of the repudiations of the
 U.S. Southern states. Biggs argues that many of the U.S. states justified
 their defaults with legal technicalities, a recourse that Latin America never
 would be able to get away with today. He cites the Council of Foreign
 Bondholders' scathing comments on the case of Mississippi, where "the
 repudiation took place in conditions of peace and normalcy, and, appar-
 ently, has been accepted by the citizens of one of the most prosperous
 communities of the world" (p. 107). Biggs notes the repeated refusals of
 the U.S. federal government to assume any responsibility for the delin-
 quent debt of the states, in contrast with the current situation in Latin
 America, where governments have often taken responsibility for private-
 sector foreign debts as a result of pressure from U.S. creditors.
 Like Maddison, Biggs notes that the economic policies adopted in
 Latin America in the 1930s differed greatly from those of the 1980s, with
 defaults and inward-oriented economic policies chosen during the earlier
 period. In contrast with the 1980s, Latin American countries unilaterally
 suspended their debt servicing, although they did not repudiate their
 debts. The crucial factor was that creditors did not retaliate. Biggs ascribes
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 the absence of creditor sanctions to a variety of political and institutional
 factors, including the lack of cohesion among individual bondholders and
 the U.S. government's refusal to act as an agent for private creditors.
 President Franklin Roosevelt took a much more enlightened attitude
 toward Latin America than did the Reagan administration in viewing
 expansion of trade as a way to improve relations. Subsequently, debtors
 and creditors arrived at agreements that reduced debt-service obligations
 substantially. Biggs also notes that debtors were able to reduce their debts
 through buybacks at large discounts on the secondary market. In the
 1980s, in contrast, creditors have been able to take the initiative in the
 negotiations, and until the Brady Plan, full-interest servicing has been
 demanded, despite the fact that Latin American interest payments rela-
 tive to gross national product (GNP) and exports are greater than the debt
 service owed in the 1930s.
 In summary, Biggs has amply documented his case that the current
 debt crisis is historically unprecedented in its magnitude, in the lack of
 creditor concessions, and hence in the costs imposed on the debtors. La
 crisis de la deuda latinoamerica is a significant and timely book.
 SOURCES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS
 International economics textbooks demonstrate how international
 lending can be mutually beneficial to all parties involved. International
 lending can be regarded as intertemporal trade, a form of international
 exchange where the borrower "purchases" present consumption in ex-
 change for future consumption. That is, international capital flows allow
 a more efficient global allocation of resources over time. The creditor
 countries receive a higher return on their saving than they would if they
 were confined to domestic investment, whereas a borrowing country is
 able to obtain funds for investment at lower costs or to smooth fluctua-
 tions in consumption in response to transitory adverse economic shocks.5
 A case could be made (and indeed was made in the 1970s) that interna-
 tional lending to developing countries like those in Latin America fits this
 optimistic characterization.6 Latin American and other newly industrializ-
 ing countries could fruitfully borrow for both reasons: high investment
 opportunities associated with structural change and financing of tempo-
 rary economic shocks.
 Clearly, however, the optimistic view of lending to Latin America
 has not been borne out by the experience of the 1980s. What went wrong?
 Was the problem unforeseen shocks or deep systemic flaws? Who was
 responsible-greedy banks, irresponsible Latin American governments,
 5. For example, see Krugman and Obstfeld (1988), chap. 7.
 6. See Sachs (1981) for such a view.
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 or the destabilizing influences of OPEC, Paul Volcker, and Ronald Rea-
 gan? These questions continue to be hotly debated, as occurs in Latin
 America's Debt Crisis, edited by Robert Pastor. While most of the contribu-
 tions in this volume are too short to constitute a full analysis and much of
 the discussion of remedies is dated, the Pastor volume presents a wide
 diversity of views on the causes of the debt problem and what to do about
 it. The contributors include policymakers and analysts from both debtor
 and creditor countries and representatives of commercial banks. A sub-
 stantial range of views by eminent policymakers is represented, including
 former U.S. President Carter, David Mulford of the U.S. Treasury, U.S.
 Senator Bill Bradley, and former Mexican Finance Minister Jesus Silva
 Herzog. As Richard Feinberg points out in an excellent summary of the
 papers, the "institutional location or political position of analysts tends to
 be a good predictor" of their views of the causes of the debt problem
 (p. 125). The bankers, like Terence Canavan of Chemical Bank, argue that
 the loans were not foolish and that unforeseeable external shocks caused
 the problems. Meanwhile, policymakers from developing countries like
 Manuel Azpuirua of Venezuela, although agreeing that external shocks
 were important, argue that "instability of international money markets"
 played a large role in inducing excessive lending (p. 78). Eduardo Wies-
 ner, formerly of the IMF, and Mulford cite the excessive role of the state
 sector in Latin America as a central problem. Pastor is to be commended
 for assembling such a distinguished and diverse group of commentators.
 The brevity of the articles is useful for those wishing for a quick summary,
 but Latin America's Debt Crisis would have achieved more lasting value if
 the contributions had been more systematic.
 The Role of the Banks
 Commercial bank lending to developing countries and especially
 Latin America in the late 1960s and 1970s represented a dramatic change
 in the international economy in that the flow of private financial capital to
 the Third World had been very low since the debacle of the 1930s. Several
 authors remind readers that it is often forgotten that the "recycling" of the
 OPEC surplus was widely praised and encouraged in the 1970s. Analysts
 sympathetic to the nationalism of developing countries, such as Edmar
 Bacha and Carlos Diaz Alejandro (1982), argued that private-bank lending
 had attractive characteristics from the debtors' viewpoint, compared with
 direct foreign investment and official loans, which tend to be more intru-
 sive politically.
 In hindsight, some authors have come to view the banks as the
 main culprits. A notable example of this view is The Loan Pushers by
 William Darity, Jr., and Bobbie Horn, whose clever title reveals the au-
 thors' biases. Darity and Horn contend that the lending booms of the
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 1920s and 1970s were driven by the supply of loans rather than by the
 demand for credit, although the authors qualify this view in some re-
 spects. They do not marshall much new evidence to indict the banks as
 loan pushers and countries as defenseless addicts, however. Most of the
 book consists of a survey of alternative theories of banking and finance,
 ranging from the rational expectations view popular among neoclassical
 economists to the Minsky-Kindleberger view of speculative cycles to
 Marxist theories of imperialism. Darity and Horn themselves favor a
 rather unclear notion of the debt crisis as somehow reflecting the "com-
 bative transition from capitalism to the managerial estate" when finance
 comes to dominate capitalist economies (p. 149).
 Darity and Horn make their case that financial markets can be
 prone to irrationality, and their survey offers a useful introduction to some
 important theories. For example, the view of Jack Guttentag and Richard
 Herring that banks are subject to "disaster myopia" seems convincing
 considering the surprisingly low loan spreads (often less than 1 percent)
 charged to Latin American and other borrowers. Unfortunately, Darity
 and Horn oversimplify the role of the banks by characterizing them as
 "loan pushers." It seems clear that lenders paid insufficient attention to
 the uses of funds by borrowers and their economic policies, due in part to
 insufficient information and inexperience, but part of the responsibility
 for this situation is the lack of supervision by regulators, who often
 encouraged this "recycling." Also, as discussed earlier, Stallings has
 shown that it is misleading in theory and in practice to look only at the
 supply side of the market for loans.
 William Guttman, whose Between Bailout and Breakdown will be
 discussed further on, offers a less critical view of the role of the banks. He
 notes that "the mantle of 'villain' has surprisingly been placed on the
 international banking system. The surprise results not from the blame-
 lessness of the banks but from their role as mere transmitters-not gener-
 ators-of global shock" (p. 5). He observes that banks sought to protect
 themselves from risk through a variety of institutional mechanisms such
 as syndication, floating rate loans, and short maturities. Unfortunately,
 some of these features, which are perfectly rational from the point of view
 of an individual bank, increase the vulnerability of the system as a whole
 to certain types of global shocks, such as world recession and high real
 interest rates induced by tight monetary policies in the creditor countries
 (precisely what transpired). It can be argued, however, that the banks
 should have been aware of the possibility of global shocks-after all, a
 world recession caused by oil shocks and contractionary monetary policy
 had happened only a few years earlier in 1974-75. In this light, the second
 oil shock and the Volcker deflation cannot be regarded as complete
 surprises.
 The international debt debacle is not evidence that international
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 lending by private agents is inherently undesirable. Rather, it proves that
 financial markets are prone to crisis in the absence of regulation and
 sound macroeconomic policies in the debtor and creditor countries.
 Mismanagement in Latin America
 There can be little doubt that mismanagement in Latin America
 played an important role in the origins of the crisis, although this point too
 is often exaggerated with the benefit of hindsight. As Diaz Alejandro
 (1984) aptly pointed out, few observers can credibly claim to have fore-
 seen the effects of the continent-wide policy mistakes, and economic
 policy was far from homogeneous across Latin America. Nonetheless,
 Sachs (1985) conclusively showed that Latin American mismanagement
 played an important role because the magnitude of the adverse external
 shocks of the 1980s were at least as great in East Asia, where countries
 (other than the Philippines) achieved far superior economic performances
 and avoided any interruptions in their debt servicing.
 A number of books under review here undertake critical reex-
 aminations of Latin American economic policies and structure in attempts
 to determine the roots of mismanagement. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski's Latin
 American Debt presents an excellent overview of the origins and evolution
 of the debt crisis, although it may be too cautious and orthodox for some
 tastes. He points to a number of features of the political economy of Latin
 America that led to the current situation. Underlying historical, geo-
 graphical, cultural, and social forces contributed to economic outcomes.
 Kuczynski cites the existence of sizable internal markets in large Latin
 American countries that made outward orientation less pressing than in
 East Asia. The Spanish colonial legacy of granting monopolies partly
 explains the excessive role of the state and its reliance on patronage.
 Another factor was the combined experience of the Depression and World
 War II, which strengthened the case for an inward-looking approach to
 development. Also, the greater influence of U.S. culture on consumption
 patterns in Latin America (compared with most other developing coun-
 tries) when added to the growing political power of the urban middle class
 increased the bias toward urban industrialism and against agriculture in
 Latin America, as compared with Asia. The influx of labor to urban areas
 along with slow employment growth in private manufacturing has re-
 sulted in "great pressure on the government to provide employment
 either directly or through state enterprises" (p. 16).
 Kuczynski reviews Latin American performance in the 1960s and
 1970s and notes a mixture of favorable and unfavorable dimensions. The
 negative features were an excessive bias toward industry that resulted in a
 neglect of agriculture and an unusually skewed distribution of income. He
 points out that Latin America nevertheless emerged from the 1970s with
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 "healthier, longer-living, better-educated populations than twenty years
 earlier" (p. 27). During the 1970s, a number of stresses led to a slowdown
 in growth. First, increased reliance on foreign capital was not accom-
 panied by increased efficiency of capital investment but resulted from a
 variety of factors like public-sector deficits and erratic monetary and
 exchange-rate policies. Second, protectionism became increasingly costly
 as the import-substitution policy was pushed too far and inefficiency
 resulted. Inefficiency was also exacerbated by the uncontrolled expansion
 of state enterprises. Third, the violent lurches of macroeconomic policies
 between populism and orthodoxy have hardly been conducive to sta-
 bility. Fourth, nationalistic opposition to direct foreign investment led to
 greater reliance on bank loans for financing current-account deficits. One
 symptom of these cumulative stresses was capital flight, which increased
 sharply at the end of the 1970s.
 Kuczynski devotes particular attention in Latin American Debt to
 what he regards as the excessive role of government, especially public
 enterprises. The underground economy has boomed in many countries in
 response to extremely onerous regulations. He castigates the role of state
 enterprise as a major contributor to public-sector deficits and external
 borrowing. While acknowledging that some efficient state enterprises
 exist, Kuczynski maintains that the majority are bloated, inefficient, and
 unprofitable. They continue to operate because of political pressures
 rather than economic efficiency. He cites a number of anecdotes to illus-
 trate this view but produces little hard evidence, making the indictment of
 the size of the public sector not altogether convincing. Indeed, Sachs
 (1985) argued that the size of the public sector has not differed markedly
 between East Asia and Latin America, and consequently it may not be the
 size of the public sector per se but rather its efficiency and insulation from
 special-interest pressures that is crucial. Nonetheless, Kuczynski is surely
 right in suggesting that the role of the public sector in Latin America must
 be redirected.
 Howard Wiarda's analysis of the origins of the debt crisis in Latin
 America at the Crossroads is similar to Kuczynski's, although Wiarda's style
 is more lively and less rigorous. Wiarda and Kuczynski differ in their
 assessment of the management of the debt crisis, however, as will be
 discussed further on. Wiarda points to the same mix of external and
 internal factors, and his diagnosis of Latin American policy mistakes also
 stresses the excessive role of the public sector. Latin America at the Cross-
 roads is written in an exuberant style that manifests the author's genuine
 concern for Latin America, but its arguments are not always carefully
 reasoned and documented. Although the work was published in 1987,
 most of the tables present only data through 1983 or even earlier. Like
 Kuczynski, Wiarda favors deregulation and privatization but at a moder-
 ate pace: "Cutbacks need to be made. .. but . .. need to be prudent and
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 guarded so that . . . they do not undermine and destabilize the very
 countries we are seeking to support" (p. 19). Wiarda sensibly calls for less
 ideological approaches to economic policy and expresses some optimism
 that such changes may be forthcoming.
 In contrast to the moderate right-wing views of Kuczynski and
 Wiarda, two other books adopt a left-wing approach to the Latin Ameri-
 can foreign debt: Susan George's A Fate Worse than Debt and Jacobo
 Schatan's World Debt: Who Is to Pay? Perhaps surprisingly, these two
 analysts place substantial blame on the debtors themselves, although they
 also fault external influences. The approaches of George and Schatan
 provide a welcome contrast to more orthodox ones, especially in their
 stress on the distributional and environmental concerns often neglected
 in narrower economic analyses. Unfortunately, however, both books are
 far too sweeping in their judgments, lack analytical rigor, and make
 numerous elementary errors in economic analysis. For example, George
 blames high U.S. interest rates on "demented" military spending, dis-
 regarding the more important roles of tax reductions and tight monetary
 policies. She adopts a rather extreme view of the IMF as an instrument of
 the major industrial countries, although she later acknowledges that the
 United Kingdom and Italy "at one time" had IMF stabilization programs
 too. Schatan refers to Latin American strategy as "export-led indus-
 trialization" while George disparages "exportomania," when most coun-
 tries relied on import substitution rather than export promotion as their
 primary strategy. Schatan's claim that banks gain from high interest rates
 fails to recognize that banks profit from the spread between loan and
 deposit rates, not the overall level of rates. These lapses are regrettable
 because the fundamental message of these books, especially George's,
 should be taken seriously. Environmental protection in developing coun-
 tries, now increasingly appreciated outside left-wing circles, is strongly
 stressed in both books. George makes a cogent case for altering IMF
 stabilization programs to give greater weight to distributional concerns,
 as will be discussed later.
 George regards the misuse of the borrowed funds not as an acci-
 dent but as the result of a fundamentally flawed model of development,
 the "mal-development model." In her view, this model "calls for indus-
 trialization at all costs" (p. 16) and results in corruption, "gilding of
 technological lilies," and environmental degradation that benefits only
 the elites of these countries. George argues with passion that develop-
 ment strategies and the adjustment to the debt crisis have engendered
 adverse distributional consequences, although her evidence is mostly
 anecdotal. She adopts the structuralist view that success in international
 trade is impossible for developing countries in view of depressed com-
 modity prices and protectionism in the rich countries, but this view has
 been falsified by the East Asian experience, which she does not discuss.
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 Schatan goes even further than George in his critique of the estab-
 lished order in Latin America, noting that it displays a "marked compo-
 nent of irrationality" (p. 44). Like those taking more orthodox approaches,
 he cites exchange rate and monetary policies as important factors, but he
 argues that the more fundamental problem is that Latin American con-
 sumption patterns are modeled on wasteful Western patterns, which
 meet superfluous and false needs. Much of World Debt is a diatribe against
 consumerist society, which the author contends is an underlying cause of
 the debt problem through its effects on spurring imports. Schatan carries
 out a dubious exercise purporting to show that most Latin American
 imports are unnecessary-they are either useless or could be produced
 domestically. The latter category disregards the basic principle of com-
 parative advantage, which holds that it is preferable to import rather than
 to produce domestically if the real resource cost is lower. Schatan classifies
 imports according to their degree of intrinsic uselessness: 100 percent
 useless televisions and watches, 33 percent useless vehicle parts, and so
 on (p. 81). He may have a point in decrying the materialistic ethos inap-
 propriate for a poor country. But this line of thinking leads him to rather
 totalitarian prescriptions, such as "it should not be very hard for a given
 community to distinguish between necessary and redundant articles"
 (p. 66). It seems unlikely that many Latin Americans or anyone else would
 wish to live in a society that decides that televisions and watches should
 be banned. Moreover, in this reviewer's opinion, it is not so much mate-
 rialism itself but rather the extreme inequality of income and wealth that
 leads to the highly skewed consumption pattern that justifiably disturbs
 Schatan.
 Developing Country Debt and the World Economy contains a number of
 country studies of Latin America and Asia that shed light on the quality of
 economic management. Each of the four Latin American cases (Mexico,
 Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil) demonstrates how policies in the 1970s
 contributed to current difficulties. The country studies are extremely
 useful, although they cover developments only through 1987. The contrast
 between South Korea and the Latin American countries is particularly
 illuminating.
 In a precisely argued and well-documented chapter on Mexico,
 Edward Buffie and Allen Sangines Krauss question some conventional
 views of recent Mexican economic history. It is often alleged that the
 structural failures of the period of "stabilizing development" of the 1950s
 and 1960s set the stage for Mexico's subsequent difficulties. But Buffie and
 Sangines show that little hard evidence can be found of low growth in
 employment, a worsening income distribution, and fiscal excesses during
 this period. They locate the roots of the current Mexican crisis instead in
 the policies of the administrations of Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez
 Portillo in the 1970s. Buffie and Sangines convincingly argue that during
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 this period fiscal and monetary policies became wildly overexpansionary.
 These irresponsible macroeconomic policies, combined with controlled
 interest rates and a fixed exchange rate, led to capital flight. The 1976
 stabilization was abandoned because the oil boom was accompanied by a
 near complete relaxation of fiscal control. Despite "the exceptional oppor-
 tunity to embark on an era of high and stable growth" afforded by the oil
 wealth, "Mexico obtained remarkably little for the $59.7 billion of debt
 taken out during the Lopez Portillo years" (p. 155). Buffie and Sangines go
 on to argue that the import-compression policies followed by the admin-
 istration of Miguel de la Madrid in the 1980s have been too draconian in
 view of the essential role in production of imports of capital and inter-
 mediate goods.
 Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo demonstrate that in
 Argentina too, "domestic events were the dominant factor," although
 adverse external forces were certainly important (p. 44). In particular, the
 disastrous policies pursued under Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz in the
 1970s represented a continuation of the swings between populist and
 orthodox extremes that have characterized Argentine economic history.
 The results of these perennial conflicts have been slow growth, inflation
 fed by fiscal deficits, and exchange-rate instability. Especially significant
 in the late 1970s was the overvaluation of the exchange rate, induced in an
 attempt to force down inflation. The overvaluation was particularly insid-
 ious in that the initial effects were quite benign, raising real incomes while
 lowering inflation, but the ultimate effects were capital flight and financial
 collapse. The legacy of mismanagement in Argentina leaves the country
 with difficult choices between debt servicing, domestic investment, and
 consumption. It is impossible to sustain all three, according to Dornbusch
 and de Pablo. So far, investment has been squeezed. Unfortunately, debt
 relief may not be enough to ensure recovery because a fundamental
 reordering of economic policy is necessary.
 Juan Antonio Morales's and Jeffrey Sachs's study of Bolivia searches
 for the underlying political structures that have led to economic distor-
 tions. Like Argentina, Bolivia has a long history of political instability and
 conflict. For various historical reasons, the state came to play a central role
 in Bolivian economic development, but the conflicts between social groups
 and the weak capacities of the government have led to inconsistent
 economic policies. In particular, the government has sought to evade
 conflicts over the distribution of income through fiscal and monetary
 expansion, resulting in high inflation. Efficiency has been the victim of
 "deep politicization of almost all instruments of economic policy" (p. 65).
 The most recent example was the boom in the 1970s fueled by foreign
 borrowing, which exacerbated the underlying weaknesses by relaxing
 fiscal constraints and increasing inequality. When capital inflows abruptly
 stopped, Bolivia resorted to increasing the money supply to finance the
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 fiscal deficit, resulting in a vicious circle of rising inflation and declining
 real tax revenues. The hyperinflation was halted in 1985 by a stabilization
 policy, which Morales and Sachs praise for combining orthodox fiscal
 restraint and price liberalization with heterodox debt relief.7 In their view,
 longer-term structural adjustments remain the crucial requisite for sus-
 tained growth: the role of the state must be redirected toward reducing
 income inequality through higher taxes on the rich and greater public
 spending on rural development, while allowing a greater role for market
 forces in allocating resources.
 Brazil's main error in the 1970s was excessively expansionary pol-
 icies in the face of adverse external circumstances, according to Eliana
 Cardoso and Albert Fishlow. The availability of foreign finance allowed
 Brazil to maintain high growth, although at the cost of a sharply increas-
 ing foreign debt. Although capital inflows financed investment rather
 than consumption, reliance on foreign debt had placed Brazil in a pre-
 carious position by the time the second oil shock hit. The subsequent
 failure of the Cruzado Plan can also be ascribed to excessive stimulus of
 domestic demand, as will be discussed further on. Regrettably, the model
 of external debt, budget deficits, and inflation in this chapter is too
 abbreviated to be comprehensible.
 As Susan Collins and Won-Am Park show in their chapter on South
 Korea in Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, the textbook
 argument for debt accumulation to finance investment and adjustment
 can be valid. South Korea's ratio of foreign debt to GNP in the early 1980s
 was comparable to those of Brazil and Mexico, and yet by the second half
 of the 1980s, Korea succeeded in combining a rapidly growing economy
 with reductions in its external debt through current-account surpluses,
 which were achieved through astonishing export growth. While the
 sources of Korea's successes in the 1980s are still being debated, they do
 show that at least part of the Latin American failures are internal in that
 Korea and Latin America faced similar external environments. Govern-
 ment intervention was heavy, but unlike that in Latin America, Korean
 policymakers focused on long-term efficiency and growth. The crucial
 difference between Korea and many of the Latin American debtors seems
 to be the effectiveness of policy rather than the size of government.
 The World Economy
 Virtually all the authors of the books reviewed here agree that the
 world economy has played a destabilizing role and contributed to the
 severity of the debt problem, although they sometimes differ considerably
 7 Sachs was an advisor to the Bolivian government and helped to design the stabilization
 program.
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 in the importance they attach to external shocks and the ways in which
 these shocks were transmitted to developing countries. Kuczynski refers
 to the "two blades of the financial scissors"-falling commodity prices and
 rising foreign interest rates-which cut deeply into the Latin American
 balance of payments (p. 73).
 Little doubt exists that high real interest rates in the 1980s dealt a
 major unanticipated blow to Latin American countries with a large vol-
 ume of floating interest-rate debt. The deleterious effect of high real
 interest rates is Tim Congdon's major theme in The Debt Threat. He takes
 an alarmist view of the growth of indebtedness, attempting to dramatize
 what he regards as an extremely dangerous situation. Congdon argues
 that high real interest rates are causing unsustainable debt problems
 throughout the world for the U.S. government, the private sector, and the
 developing countries. His argument is that ratio of debt to GNP grows
 unsustainably if the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of real GNP.
 With currently high real interest rates, therefore, debts are set to grow
 unsustainably. High real interest rates are due in turn to fiscal profligacy,
 according to Congdon, who muses nostalgically about the "old-time fiscal
 religion" of balanced budgets. He vitriolically attacks the "voodoo eco-
 nomics" of Keynes and Reagan, whom he lumps together as apostles of
 fiscal irresponsibility. In his zeal against fiscal deficits, Congdon fails to
 emphasize sufficiently other important causes of high real interest rates,
 especially the tight monetary policies pursued in the United States and
 elsewhere. He also fails to recognize that the Reagan fiscal expansion
 played a constructive role in ending the world recession of the early 1980s.
 Congdon advocates budget surpluses-even for West Germany and Japan,
 with their large trade surpluses. In short, he seems to have overstated the
 adverse effects of budget deficits and the benefits of surpluses at all times.
 It is nevertheless true that the mix of tight monetary policy and expan-
 sionary fiscal policy in the United States has created many negative
 consequences for the United States as well as for Latin American debtors,
 whose debts are mostly dollar-denominated at floating interest rates.
 Congdon's chapters on Latin American debt are often insightful but
 somewhat rambling, and they do not strongly support his main thesis that
 high real interest rates are the sole root of the problem.
 What conclusions emerge from these various interpretations of the
 origins of the debt crisis? While the emphasis can be debated, it would be
 hard to disagree with Silva Herzog that "We were all responsible" (in Latin
 America's Debt Crisis, p. 33). Furthermore, the interactions of the three
 forces considered-the excessive magnitude and systemic dangers of
 bank loans, the structural weaknesses and policy blunders in Latin Amer-
 ica, and the instability of the world economy-added up to more than the
 sum of the parts and contributed to the disastrous outcomes. The country
 studies in Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, however, con-
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 stitute persuasive evidence that the dominant factor was internal mis-
 management in Latin America. The banks were undeniably imprudent,
 and the instability of the world economy increased the riskiness of foreign
 indebtedness, but the availability of bank credit represented an oppor-
 tunity for development that was misused in Latin America.
 THE BURDEN OF ADJUSTMENT
 Unlike the experience of the 1930s, outright defaults have mostly
 been avoided in the "cooperative" strategy engineered by the Interna-
 tional Monetary Fund and the U.S. government. The cooperative ap-
 proach has been predicated on a combination of austerity in the debtor
 countries, new loans from commercial banks and international agencies,
 and a stable world economy. Many of the studies reviewed here praise
 these efforts in forestalling a financial collapse. But increased attention
 has been devoted to what almost all authors regard as highly unbalanced
 outcomes. The uneven burden has two components: first, between debtor
 and creditor countries, and second, among social groups within the
 debtors. The distribution between creditors and debtors has been ineq-
 uitable in that the debtors have suffered sharp declines in standards of
 living in the process of achieving the substantial trade surpluses that have
 enabled them to continue paying most of the interest due on their debts
 with little net new lending. Although it is wrong to argue that banks have
 actually profited from the crisis in that their equity prices have been very
 depressed relative to those of other corporations, until recently banks
 have been unwilling to grant either net new loans or debt relief, with the
 result being that actual earnings have remained high. It is widely asserted
 that the poor in the debtor countries have suffered far more from austerity
 than the elites. While a near consensus exists that the distribution of
 burdens was unbalanced in these senses, substantial disagreement re-
 mains as to the interpretations of these outcomes.
 Interpretations of the Official Strategies
 Kuczynski again takes a rather orthodox view in arguing that the
 initial policies of "devalue, deflate, and deregulate," which were pro-
 moted by the IMF and the Reagan administration, were inevitable and
 appropriate because they were the only way for the debtors to restore
 equilibrium quickly to the balance of payments. He recognizes, however,
 that the cost to the debtors has been steep in terms of output, investment,
 and standard of living. Part of the problem has been the unwillingness of
 the banks to extend new loans. Kuczynski also ascribes the stabilization
 policies' failure to restore growth to three sources: the difficulties of
 curbing public-sector deficits when debt-servicing costs escalated due to
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 interest-rate increases and devaluation, the ability of state enterprises to
 escape controls, and the "stagflationary" effects of devaluation and price
 deregulation.
 Knud Erik Svendsen is more critical of the creditor countries'
 approach to Latin American debt in The Failure of the International Debt
 Strategy. Like most others, he recognizes the achievement of preventing a
 collapse of the international banking system, but he argues that this
 outcome could have been obtained in ways less detrimental to the debtor
 countries, although he does not spell out these alternatives. Svendsen
 maintains that the "muddling through" strategy promoted by the Reagan
 administration is a misnomer because it was actually a coherent strategy,
 albeit a misguided one. He argues that the dominant perspective during
 the first few years of the crisis was to regard the problem as a temporary
 liquidity crisis in which the creditworthiness of the debtors could be
 restored through a combination of recovery in the developed countries,
 austerity in the debtors, and concerted lending. Svendsen sharply criti-
 cizes the dominance of right-wing ideology in shaping the policies of the
 IMF, which in turn reflects the influence of the United States. He contends
 that given the state of the world economy and the recessions in the debtor
 countries, the IMF should have adopted a more flexible approach (also
 unspecified). He argues further that the IMF is poorly placed to deal with
 long-term structural difficulties. It is not completely clear from Svendsen's
 brief analysis, however, whether he regards the misguided debt strategy
 as a good-faith error or a deliberate attempt to extract resources from the
 debtors.
 Svendsen makes the interesting argument that the Nordic coun-
 tries of Europe, with their tradition of concern for developing countries,
 should have come forth with alternatives to the orthodox strategy. Al-
 though he discusses the experience of Scandinavian aid to Tanzania, the
 upshot of his argument remains unclear. He concludes by urging new
 approaches but is vague here too.
 Wiarda is also critical of the management of the crisis, although for
 a different reason. He argues that the current situation is an impossible
 one: debtors are unable to repay, but it is in everyone's interest to main-
 tain the illusion that the situation is "manageable." Hence Wiarda regards
 all efforts to avert default as a form of successful obfuscation, "one of the
 great 'smoke and mirrors' operations of all time" (p. 30). Wiarda's view
 that debt relief would have to be part of the solution in the long run has
 proven to be prescient. He correctly anticipated in 1985-86 that the banks
 and taxpayers would be called on to pay for debt relief in the next few
 years. Wiarda's cynical evaluation of the international strategy, however,
 seems exaggerated. William Cline (1983) and Paul Krugman (1985) have
 demonstrated a theoretical rationale for a combination of concerted lend-
 ing with debtor-country adjustments. The essence of their arguments is
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 that new loans take on the character of a public good during a debt crisis
 because each creditor in isolation prefers to reduce exposure but an
 attempt by all creditors to do so is likely to force an illiquid debtor into
 complete default. Here Wiarda, along with many other non-economists
 and even some economists, errs in assuming that inability to repay a debt
 fully is the same as insolvency. Ongoing concerns like the U.S. govern-
 ment and private corporations are not expected to "repay" but merely to
 service their debts in a timely fashion. In fact, it can be argued that part of
 the problem is that in view of the large resource transfers creditors have
 received in recent years, the debtors have in effect been servicing their
 debts too rapidly rather than too slowly. Later in Latin America at the
 Crossroads, Wiarda seems to modify his analysis by acknowledging that "a
 great deal can be said in favor of such a pragmatic, largely ad hoc way of
 dealing with the crisis" (p. 92).
 George presents a vehement radical critique of the debt strategy,
 but without the usual opaque Marxist jargon. She candidly acknowledges
 that "when I started doing research on the debt crisis, I was prepared to
 assign the role of global ogre to the IMF" (p. 47). She emerged with a more
 sophisticated view of the IMF as a less powerful organization than she
 initially assumed. George argues nonetheless that the IMF acts as an
 agent for governments and banks in the rich countries and elites in the
 developing countries. She decries the shortsightedness of the stabiliza-
 tion policies from distributional and developmental points of view, argu-
 ing that cuts in subsidies for basic necessities lead to deterioration of
 human capital and undermine economic potential in the long run. The
 IMF's response that it is neutral vis-a-vis the distributional and social
 consequences of stabilization policies is, in her view, "politely put, rub-
 bish" (p. 53). George argues persuasively that the fundamental inequities
 involved originate with political power. Elites with accounts in foreign
 banks who have benefited enormously from the foreign debt accumu-
 lation are not sharing the burden of adjustment, while the poor are
 shouldering an unfair portion. International cooperation would make it
 possible to identify much of the capital flight and tax evasion that has
 taken place, and the failure of the international community to do so
 reflects the power of the elites in both North and South in protecting their
 interests. Unfortunately, George has not fully documented her assertions
 about the increasing inequality and poverty that have resulted from the
 management of the debt crisis, although her view is widely shared and
 plausible. Such a task is admittedly difficult in view of the paucity of data.
 The strength of A Fate Worse Than Debt comes from the genuine moral
 indignation that George conveys and her lively personal style, even
 though the work is weakened by lack of rigor in its arguments.8
 8. For a more rigorous radical critique of the IMF, see Pastor (1987).
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 Several chapters of Developing Country Debt and the World Economy
 assess the period from 1982 to 1987. Sebastian Edwards maintains that
 structural adjustment in the debtor countries was not nearly as orthodox
 as is commonly alleged. Citing evidence for 1986, he contends that the
 trade surpluses have been smaller than net interest payments, indicating
 that capital flows have remained substantial. Furthermore, according to
 Edwards, economic adjustment has often 'been inflationary with high
 and persistent fiscal deficits, and with increasingly distorted external
 sectors" (p. 253), hardly what a strict monetarist would recommend. It
 could be argued in response that inflation and the fiscal deficits are
 partially the consequence of devaluations and liberalizations, which have
 had stagflationary effects, rather than the result of lax macroeconomic
 policies. Edwards advocates a gradual trade liberalization as the center-
 piece of long-term structural adjustment. He stresses that credibility is
 essential to the success of such a program. Paul Krugman's chapter
 observes that "to a first approximation the debtors have made resource
 transfers equal to interest less official inflows," so that "debtors have been
 forced to run massive trade surpluses" (p. 285). Disagreement with Ed-
 wards on this point comes from the fact that Edwards cites data for 1986,
 when the trade surplus was unusually small relative to interest payments.
 Krugman reviews the argument for defensive lending mentioned above
 and asks why bank lending has been so small. He concludes that the most
 plausible answer is that banks were able to shift almost the entire burden
 of adjustment onto debtors. This conclusion raises the question of why
 banks were able to achieve such successful bargains, one that will be
 addressed further on. Finally, Dornbusch's chapter in Developing Country
 Debt examines the behavior of the world economy between 1982 and 1987
 in terms of its effect on debtor countries. While world output growth has
 recovered well, commodity prices have not fully recovered in real terms,
 and real interest rates have remained high. In summary, these features of
 the world economy as well as the low level of capital inflows into debtor
 countries have resulted in a rather unfavorable setting for the resumption
 of growth in Latin America.
 Effects of Austerity
 In view of the declines in per capita income in Latin America and
 the widespread opinion that the poor have borne the brunt of this decline,
 it would be useful to have more complete information on the effects of
 austerity on the welfare of Latin Americans. William Canak aims to fill
 this void with Lost Promises: Debt, Development, and Austerity in Latin
 America, which includes contributions from disciplines ranging from soci-
 ology, political science, and economics to geography. Unfortunately, few
 of the contributions provide detailed evidence or careful analysis. Two
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 interesting articles on the politics of heterodox stabilization policies will
 be discussed in the following section. The article by Ralph Hakkert and
 Franklin Goza on the demographic consequences of austerity is carefully
 substantiated. They point out that many of the alleged effects of the debt
 crisis on mortality are not supported by hard evidence for the countries
 they examine. They nonetheless conclude that some adjustments are
 likely to have adverse long-term consequences, such as children drop-
 ping out of school. Alejandro Rofman argues sensibly that regional devel-
 opment strategies will have to be scaled down in view of the shortage of
 capital and the failure of past capital-intensive approaches. Other articles
 are less persuasively argued, provide little concrete information on the
 effects of austerity, or have no bearing on the central theme of Lost
 Promises. Given the paucity of hard information, generalizations about the
 adverse effects of austerity are difficult to assess.
 POLITICAL ECONOMY
 The origins of the current economic crisis in Latin America lie to a
 large extent in the mismanagement of domestic economic policies in the
 period leading up to the crisis, as discussed. This conclusion raises the
 question of why so many countries erred so grievously. As seen in the
 previous section, the severity and length of the downturn have resulted
 from unequal sharing between creditors and debtors of the burden of
 adjustment to the debt crisis, a situation that Biggs has shown to be
 historically unprecedented. But why were debtors so compliant? It has
 been increasingly recognized, even by economists, that the interaction
 between politics and economics is central to understanding both the
 bargaining between debtors and creditors and the choice of economic
 policies by Latin American governments.
 Negotiations between Creditors and Debtors
 The highly unequal distribution of the burden of adjustment is
 difficult to understand on the basis of economic considerations alone.
 Why have the Latin American debtors been willing to run large trade
 surpluses in order to continue paying most of the interest on their debts
 without any sign of a resumption of voluntary lending by the banks or
 increased foreign aid from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
 and Development. Economic theories of optimal default as well as the
 historical precedents would seem to suggest that countries should either
 strike a better bargain or engage in unilateral actions along the lines of
 Peru's limiting debt service to 10 percent of exports. Why have the debtors
 been so compliant and failed to form a united debtors' cartel to strengthen
 their negotiating stance?
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 Managing World Debt, edited by Stephany Griffith-Jones, attempts
 to answer these questions by using applied bargaining theory. This vol-
 ume contains two types of contributions: country studies as well as
 overviews of the analytical foundations and empirical findings. This
 collection is another example of an excellent idea with flawed execution.
 The concept of bargaining seems a fruitful one, as laid out in Griffith-
 Jones's introductory chapter, and some important insights emerge. For
 example, Griffith-Jones argues that creditors were able to outmaneuver
 debtors by taking the initiative in making proposals and establishing
 precedents in their favor. Unfortunately, the analytical chapters that fol-
 low are somewhat vague, and most of the country studies do not provide
 the type of information and analysis needed to employ the bargaining
 approach. As Carlos Fortin observes in his overview chapter, the country
 studies "do not go into the pressure group and public opinion politics
 surrounding the negotiations" (p. 326). Instead, many of the country
 studies provide general information that does not bear directly on the
 negotiations. Exceptions to this generalization are Angel Gurria Trevino's
 detailed chronology and analysis of the Mexican negotiations and Ricardo
 Ffrench-Davis's informative discussion of the Chilean case. Other country
 studies on Peru, Costa Rica, and Venezuela are not clearly written and
 argued, perhaps because English is not the authors' native language. For
 example, one encounters confusing sentences such as 'Public investment
 [in Peru] totalled 9 percent in the 1981-84 period" (p. 173). Did investment
 grow 9 percent over this period, annually or cumulatively, or did it
 average 9 percent of GNP? One finds numerous typographical and edit-
 ing errors throughout the volume, and a crucial table is missing from
 Ffrench-Davis's chapter, in which Table 4.7 has been replaced by Table 4.5
 (p. 123).
 In view of the weaknesses of the country studies, the empirical
 underpinning of this project, it is not surprising that the overview chap-
 ters are rather short on specifics. Diana Tussie's chapter on the important
 question of coordination among the debtor countries argues that coopera-
 tion has increased over time since the Cartagena summit in 1984. Despite
 the lack of concrete actions, she maintains that Cartagena has served "to
 coordinate bargaining tactics for mutually reinforcing effects. As such, its
 credibility is intact" (p. 305). Yet little evidence is offered for this opti-
 mistic conclusion (from the debtors' viewpoint), and subsequent events
 have not indicated any trend toward cooperation among debtors, al-
 though Tussie may be right in arguing that the threat of debtor coopera-
 tion has spurred creditors to make concessions. Griffith-Jones's conclu-
 sion provides additional interesting insights. She argues that the stronger
 financial position of banks may tip the balance of power toward the
 debtors in subsequent negotiations because the banks can no longer
 credibly cite their precarious situation as a basis for further concessions
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 from the debtors. Griffith-Jones advocates tougher bargaining by debtors,
 including unilateral actions, but she cautions against radical rhetoric
 because international financial markets respond to perceptions as much
 as reality. She also makes some implausible judgments, such as arguing
 that debtors were compliant because they were afraid of destabilizing the
 international banking system, rather than because they feared retaliation.
 The trouble with these opinions is that they are not grounded in either
 theoretical analysis or empirical observation.
 Managing World Debt does lead to some understanding of bargain-
 ing outcomes. Kuczynski provides additional insights. He points out that
 the costs of default were perceived as large by newly democratic countries
 seeking to establish their legitimacy through responsible behavior. It may
 be that middle-class Latin American citizens view default as a sign of
 backwardness. The outspoken stances taken by Alan Garcia and Fidel
 Castro in favor of unilateral actions by the debtors may actually have
 backfired by turning more moderate governments toward cooperation.
 Silva Herzog suggests in Latin America's Debt Crisis that one reason for the
 continued debt servicing in such dire circumstances is simply that debtor
 governments felt morally obliged to do so and made great efforts to act
 responsibly to establish their legitimacy, even though economic self-
 interest would have dictated a less cooperative approach. Diaz Alejandro
 (1984) argued several years ago that the internal politics of debtor coun-
 tries are an important part of the story and suggested that individual
 policymakers, not abstract "countries," make decisions about whether to
 service foreign debts. He also pointed out that many of these policy-
 makers have much to lose from default in that they and their friends are
 the ones with large accounts in foreign banks.
 Political Regimes and Economic Policies
 The links between economic policy and political regimes run in
 both directions. Authors like Sachs (1985) have sought political explana-
 tions for the divergent economic courses pursued by various countries,
 notably in Latin America and East Asia. Others have focused on the
 effects of economic outcomes on political choices. In this regard, it is often
 argued that continuing economic difficulties in Latin America threaten
 democracy. Wiarda, for example, states that "the transition toward ex-
 panded democracy that we have recently seen in Latin America is almost
 certain to be halted or reversed" (p. 59).
 Both directions of the relationship between politics and economics
 are investigated in depth in Debt and Democracy in Latin America, edited by
 Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman. This coherent volume contains
 many excellent individual contributions. What emerges from these stud-
 ies is a complex relationship between the debt crisis and political change.
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 Debt and Democracy is divided into four subsections: overview, key actors,
 country studies, and conclusions. The highlight of the overview section is
 a fascinating article by Paul Drake, comparing the political-economic
 interactions in the 1920s-1930s with those in the 1970s-1980s, which
 complements the books by Maddison and Stallings already reviewed. In
 both periods, economic shocks were associated with profound political
 upheavals. In the 1930s, however, a general shift occurred from democ-
 racies to dictatorships, whereas the 1980s have witnessed a move in the
 opposite direction. Many interesting features of the earlier period are
 brought out in Drake's informative essay, such as the roles of the U.S.
 government and Professor E. W. Kemmerer of Princeton University, "a
 sort of one-man IMF." Drake speculates that the relative longevity of
 democracies in the 1980s may reflect their greater legitimacy and flexibil-
 ity. The chapters by Dornbusch and Jeffry Frieden also offer interesting
 perspectives. Dornbusch advocates forced reinvestment of external inter-
 est payments in the debtor countries because he views the problem for
 major debtors like Argentina as a "short-run inability . . . to pay, not a
 basic insolvency" (p. 21). In his view, the crisis has been aggravated by
 creditors' insistence on excessive resource transfers. Unfortunately, the
 argument that debtors are illiquid rather than insolvent is not adequately
 substantiated here. Frieden argues that a major factor in determining the
 political behavior of agents is whether their assets are liquid or fixed.
 Those with liquid assets are able to exit the domestic political scene under
 adverse conditions and tend to favor conciliation with foreign creditors.
 The section of Debt and Democracy on major actors deals with U.S.
 policy (by Riordan Roett), national business (Sylvia Maxfield), and orga-
 nized labor (Ian Roxborough). Roett provides a knowledgeable overview
 of U.S. policy but is sometimes unduly rhetorical in his repeated asser-
 tions that the debt is an important political issue for the United States.
 Maxfield argues that the financial boom spurred by access to international
 markets led to segmentation and distortions in domestic financial mar-
 kets, with large firms enjoying preferential access at the expense of
 smaller firms. Private investment has suffered from the financial boom
 and bust. Roxborough presents data on real wages and unemployment.
 He stresses the decline in real wages, but his figures actually show a rather
 mixed pattern, with real wages above their 1980 levels for Argentina,
 Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay and sharp declines in other cases, notably
 Mexico. Roxborough scrutinizes labor policies in Brazil, Argentina, and
 Mexico. While Mexico has followed a fairly consistent orthodox policy of
 austerity, Brazil and Argentina have changed policies frequently in re-
 sponse to political pressures.
 Perhaps the strongest part of Debt and Democracy is the group of
 country studies, which cover Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile.
 Particularly interesting are Kaufman's study of Mexico, Joan Nelson's
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 study of Costa Rica, and Carol Wise's chapter on Peru. Kaufman inter-
 prets the recent history of Mexican policies as political choices between
 heterodoxy and orthodoxy and points out the flaws in both, although he
 seems to lean toward more heterodox strategies. The de la Madrid admin-
 istration has stuck consistently to an orthodox approach of deflation and
 liberalization, despite terrible costs and without any seeming benefits in
 restored creditworthiness. Kaufman contends that this choice was not
 based on rational economic logic but was conditioned by political forces,
 notably the influence of Mexican right-wing business. He calls for "signif-
 icant changes in conventional economic wisdom" (p. 124). Nelson's analy-
 sis of Costa Rica elucidates the strengths and weaknesses of democracy in
 carrying out effective economic policies. She shows how a regime with
 political legitimacy (the Luis Alberto Monge administration in 1982) was
 able to carry out effective stabilization policies of fiscal contraction and
 devaluation but in a way that cushioned the effect on the weakest ele-
 ments of society. Longer-term structural reforms, however, are more
 intractable politically in a democracy because they require more time and
 tend to be gradually undermined by special-interest groups. Wise's study
 of Peru demonstrates with depressing effectiveness that the scope for
 government policy is very limited in a situation marked by 'backward-
 ness within the government bureaucracy, enshrouded in personalistic
 politics and petty patronage . . . [to a degree] unusual even in Latin
 America" (p. 165).
 In their concluding chapter, Kaufman and Stallings attempt to
 synthesize the country studies by distinguishing three types of regimes:
 authoritarian regimes, established democracies, and transitional democ-
 racies. Authoritarian regimes can enforce tough austerity without re-
 sponding to popular suffering and pressure. Established democracies,
 such as Costa Rica, have the flexibility to pursue more mixed strategies
 that can combine orthodox fiscal restraint with heterodox concern for
 income distribution. Transitional democracies tend to adopt the weakest
 and most inconsistent economic policies, reflecting their lack of political
 legitimacy. The results are often shortsighted populist policies that result
 in external payments crises and explosive inflation. While Kaufman and
 Stallings's generalizations are plausible, they cannot be taken as con-
 clusive because of the small sample of countries and the complexity of
 each individual country's experience, which is richly documented in this
 volume.9 Kaufman and Stallings also reiterate Drake's conclusion that
 democracy may prove to be more resilient in the face of adverse economic
 circumstances than many analysts seem to believe.
 9. Remmer (1986) cautions against overemphasizing the regime variable when analyzing
 the effectiveness of stabilization policies.
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 Inflation, Orthodoxy, and Heterodoxy
 As discussed above, political pressures surrounding the distribu-
 tion of income in Latin America lead to persistent fiscal deficits, often
 financed by money creation, resulting in chronic inflation or even hyper-
 inflation. Populist excesses are then followed by extreme retrenchment of
 fiscal and monetary policies. It is well known that orthodox policies of
 demand contraction have been successful in improving external balance
 but that reduction of inflation has been painfully slow even under condi-
 tions of severe recession.10 The declines in output and employment
 associated with orthodoxy have given rise to the search for alternative
 ways of controlling inflation while avoiding recession. Two imaginative
 alternatives that initially appeared quite promising were the Plan Austral
 in Argentina and the Plan Cruzado in Brazil.
 Heterodox stabilization policies involve an attempt to influence
 expectations and contracts directly instead of through contractionary
 pressure. Two chapters in Debt, Austerity, and Development, those of Wil-
 liam Smith on Argentina and Brazil and Paul Singer on Brazil, provide
 excellent discussions of the experiments with heterodoxy in Brazil and
 Argentina. Despite promising beginnings, the experience of the Austral
 and Cruzado plans turned out to be little short of disastrous. Repeated
 failures have undermined credibility further. As Smith comments, 'Ar-
 gentina 5, Brazil 3. Unfortunately, this score is not the outcome of a soccer
 game between two traditional rivals, but the number of heterodox shocks
 each country has experienced, as of early 1988, since returning to democ-
 racy" (p. 155).
 Smith and Singer both point to the underlying political conflicts to
 explain the failures of both orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Smith views the
 basic stabilization problem as a prisoner's dilemma between labor and
 capital. Because each group has an incentive to free ride on the other's
 concessions, the result tends to be noncooperative. Singer stresses the
 dependence of all parties in Latin America on assistance from the govern-
 ment-to the point that the state becomes dependent on patronage for
 support. Both authors emphasize the role of indexation and contracts in
 making inflation difficult to eradicate. Indexation accounts for the failure
 of orthodox deflation by perpetuating inflation automatically, regardless
 of the amount of slack in the labor and goods markets. Heterodoxy
 therefore appears to be a sensible alternative. It involves breaking infla-
 tionary expectations and inertia by abolishing indexation through a cur-
 rency reform and through more controversial wage and price controls.
 Most economists recognize, however, that fiscal and monetary restraint to
 keep aggregate demand under control are also necessary to prevent new
 10. See, for example, Diaz Alejandro (1981) and Kiguel and Liviatan (1988).
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 inflationary pressures, given that fiscal deficits are often the underlying
 cause of inflation. The initial successes of the Austral and Cruzado plans
 along with irresponsible behavior of the policymakers led to dismal fail-
 ures. The administrations of Rauil Alfonsin and Jose Sarney both failed to
 follow through with demand restraint after the inflationary spiral was
 broken. With public-sector deficits still out of control, a resurgence in
 inflation was inevitable. As Singer notes, "political authorities viewed the
 heterodox shock as a sort of magic ... and concluded that the shock freed
 them from the constraints imposed by high inflation" (p. 44). Smith adds
 that policymakers need to "parlay the initial euphoria . .. into measures
 such as exchange reforms, elimination of public sector 'sacred cows,' and
 progressive taxation" (p. 156). The failures of the Alfonsin and Sarney
 administrations to take a longer perspective during the initial periods
 represent tragic errors. Were those errors avoidable? Smith and Singer
 seem to suggest that the failures were inevitable given the political pres-
 sures brought to bear on governments in the polarized Latin American
 environment. They argue for more democratic and open negotiations in
 which various interest groups can bargain and agree to support the
 program. It can also be plausibly argued, however, that the failures result
 from simple incompetence on the part of the new governments: in the
 aftermath of elections and reductions of inflation, when their popularity
 was high and the public was willing to make sacrifices in the national
 interest, Alfonsin and Sarney could have initiated some longer-term
 structural reforms while restraining growth of domestic demand.11
 NEW DIRECTIONS
 Virtually all the studies reviewed here make recommendations for
 reform. Proposals for change focus on three dimensions: macroeconomic
 and trade policy in the creditor countries, reforms in the debtor countries,
 and financial initiatives such as debt relief and ways of resuming capital
 flows from creditors to debtors. These proposals are interdependent. For
 example, reform in the debtor countries can be facilitated by creating a
 supportive environment of global macroeconomic stability and reducing
 the burden of debt-servicing. Furthermore, new capital flows are more
 likely to materialize if debtors do undertake serious reforms. To a large
 extent, the proposals can be inferred from the earlier discussion, and in
 such cases, I will not repeat my analysis. Following a brief discussion of
 other policy reforms, this section will emphasize new financial initiatives.
 A near consensus holds that macroeconomic policies in the devel-
 oped countries should become more stable and should endeavor to lower
 11. Nelson (1984) argues that new governments initially enjoy a grace period when the
 public will rally behind them.
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 real interest rates through altering the mix between fiscal and monetary
 policies while maintaining a high rate of output growth. Protectionist
 pressures against manufactured exports of developing countries hinder
 their diversification of exports and must be contained. It would also be
 desirable to improve the terms of trade for the debtors, which means
 higher real commodity prices. Some commentators, such as Larry Sjaastad
 in Foreign, Investment, Debt, and Growth (yet to be reviewed) and Fred
 Bergsten in Latin America's Debt Crisis, have pointed to the appreciation of
 the U.S. dollar as the source of commodity price deflation in the first half
 of the 1980s. This view, however, has been falsified by the failure of most
 commodity prices to rise commensurately with the subsequent sharp
 depreciation of the dollar. Currency stability may matter nonetheless in
 facilitating steady growth and open markets in the developed countries,
 factors that are crucial for the export prospects of the developing countries.
 There is also agreement that debtor countries need to improve
 macroeconomic performance, although here the nature of the policy er-
 rors and hence the requisite adjustments are more controversial, as has al-
 ready been discussed. The role of conditionality in spurring these reforms
 is also contested. Analysts with conservative points of view emphasize
 the importance of liberalizing and reducing the size of the public sector
 (Kuczynski, Wiarda, and Guttman), although moderate proponents favor
 a gradual approach, as has been shown. This view coincides with IMF and
 World Bank notions of structural adjustment embodied first in the Baker
 Plan and now in the Brady Plan. Participation in these plans has been
 made contingent on adopting market-oriented reforms like those pursued
 by Mexico.
 Senator Bradley, in Latin America's Debt Crisis, launches a scathing
 attack on the Baker Plan, calling it a "kind of supply-side imperialism"
 based on right-wing ideology rather than economic logic. Bradley pro-
 poses instead to give the debtors more leeway in formulating their own
 policies of structural adjustment. This view is echoed by Fishlow in the
 same volume. In his opinion, the Baker Plan assumes that Latin American
 governments "will follow the right policies only under external tutelage
 and [on] a short leash" (p. 105). Fishlow dismisses the view that Latin
 American nations are a bunch of "basket cases" incapable of intelligent
 behavior. He also argues that the new democracies must learn for them-
 selves how to conduct rational economic policies. In his view, which is
 amply supported by Carlos Diaz Alejandro (1981), Alejandro Foxley
 (1983), and John Sheahan (1987), extreme free-market orthodoxy has
 created highly negative consequences in Latin America, notably in the
 Southern Cone, fostering both inequality and poor growth. According to
 Fishlow, long-run reforms should include four features: a better balance
 between private and public sectors, a reversal of the bias toward open
 capital markets and closed trade, an eclectic combination of import sub-
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 stitution and export promotion in trade policy, and a frontal attack on
 inequality.
 George favors a radical sort of conditionality, under which debt
 relief would be granted in return for democratic and egalitarian reforms
 arrived at through more decentralized negotiations.12 She presents a
 collection of possible reimbursements "in kind," such as improving health
 and education for the poor, reforesting, and developing alternative energy
 sources (pp. 242-43). George's conditionality would be highly intrusive,
 however, perhaps even more so than the orthodox variety, which she
 recognizes as necessary for altering long-standing distortions and en-
 trenched interests. While George's ideas may seem hopelessly utopian,
 they have the merit of awakening readers to the reality that the many
 features of conditionality embodied in IMF orthodoxy and the Baker and
 Brady plans have distributional and political biases that can be legitimate-
 ly questioned.
 I turn now to examining new financial initiatives that aim to relieve
 the stresses on the debtor countries. Unfortunately, many of the discus-
 sions of financial initiatives have become somewhat dated, given the rapid
 progression of events-particularly the Brady Plan, which was put forth
 after all of these books were written. Nonetheless, the situation is still
 fluid, and many questions about the Brady Plan still remain unresolved,
 making it well worth examining alternative views. As was discussed in
 the section on the burden of adjustment, the books reviewed here agree
 that the magnitude of the net resource transfer from Latin America to its
 creditors is excessive and unsustainable. The resource transfer can be
 reduced through either new capital flows or lower debt service. Most
 authors view the resumption of large-scale bank lending as highly un-
 likely in the foreseeable future. Hence the focus has increasingly shifted
 to direct investment and official lending, which will be examined subse-
 quently. In the short run, however, increased inflows of direct investment
 and official lending cannot be expected to affect the balance of payments
 appreciably, and as a result, reductions in debt servicing have come to the
 forefront of the debate.
 Debt-Relief: Voluntary or Comprehensive?
 A number of writers argue strongly against comprehensive ap-
 proaches in which debt relief is carried out by a supranational agency that
 purchases debt at a discount, along the lines originally suggested by Felix
 Rohatyn and Peter Kenen in the early 1980s. John Williamson, in Voluntary
 Approaches to Debt Relief, agrees that a case can be made for debt relief but
 12. Most of George's discussion of "creative reimbursement" refers to Africa, but she goes
 on to argue that it is relevant for Latin America too.
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 contends that comprehensive approaches pose a number of serious diffi-
 culties: it will be difficult to induce banks to participate because each
 individual bank will seek to obtain a free ride on the debt reduction of
 other banks; any agency will face difficult decisions about which coun-
 tries' debt to buy at what price; such a strategy smacks of moral hazard
 and inequity because scarce public funds would be used to bail out
 countries suffering from their own mismanagement; and in any case, a
 Marshall Plan for Latin America is simply not realistic politics. Williamson
 argues nevertheless that voluntary debt relief is both feasible and desir-
 able, even for creditors. Debt relief is desirable because of the inefficien-
 cies caused by the debt overhang (the "debt-relief Laffer curve" effect,
 coined by Krugman), whereby large debt-servicing requirements act like a
 tax on sound economic policies in that creditors rather than the debtor
 reap most of the benefits from improved economic performance. Further-
 more, voluntary debt relief allows various debtors and creditors to ex-
 press their expectations about the market value of the debt and is thus
 more efficient than having a supranational agency impose its valuation
 arbitrarily on all market participants. Williamson recognizes that some
 economists have shown that buybacks are undesirable under some condi-
 tions, but he dismisses this finding as unimportant in practice.
 Williamson goes on to describe the pros and cons of particular
 types of market-based debt reduction, including buybacks, exit bonds,
 and swaps. Unfortunately, this discussion is too cursory. A nonspecialist
 seeking a clear introduction to these arcane financial transactions will be
 disappointed, while specialists will wish for a more in-depth theoretical
 and empirical analysis of these instruments. For example, only two pages
 of Voluntary Approaches to Debt Relief are devoted to debt-equity swaps.
 Williamson concludes on the basis of simulations that voluntary debt
 relief can be beneficial but may be insufficient to dent resource transfers
 sufficiently, in which case he advocates increased official lending or cap-
 italization of interest.
 Guttman and Kuczynski arrive at broadly similar assessments. In
 Between Bailout and Breakdown, Guttman stresses the same basic trade-off
 that Williamson discusses: debt relief is a public good, but it poses
 problems of moral hazard and inequity. Like Williamson, he favors a
 variety of small voluntary initiatives. Guttman's lucid and comprehensive
 discussion presents a long catalogue of initiatives for multilateral organi-
 zations, private financial institutions, creditor governments, and debtor
 governments, but it provides little detailed analysis and evaluation.
 Kuczynski advocates interest deferral but not forgiveness, as well as
 increased lending by multilateral agencies. He stresses the last approach
 as a way of relieving the stresses on debtors with "minimum funds from
 the taxpayer" (p. 196), and he favors large increases in disbursements and
 callable capital for multilateral development banks. Kuczynski maintains
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 that the costs to taxpayers are likely to be minimal in view of the low
 default rates on previous loans from these agencies, but this view can be
 questioned, given the increasingly serious problems of arrears at both the
 World Bank and the IMF.
 In New Approaches to the Latin American Debt Crisis, Jeffrey Sachs
 provides a powerful argument for comprehensive approaches and points
 out some flaws in the case for relying on market forces and official
 lending. Against those who advocate increased official lending, he points
 out that this approach is effectively a disguised subsidy from taxpayers to
 commercial banks. As noted above, banks have extended few net new
 loans and have even succeeded in lowering their exposure in real terms
 while continuing to receive most of the interest payments due. Under
 these circumstances, increased lending by official institutions amounts to
 a bailout of the banks because the official loans simply get recycled to the
 banks. It is therefore inconsistent to oppose the use of public funds to abet
 debt reduction on the grounds that taxpayers should not or will not come
 up with the money while advocating increased official lending, as Wil-
 liamson, Guttman, and Kuczynski do. Sachs also counters the equity and
 moral hazard arguments against comprehensive debt reduction by ob-
 serving that the hardships suffered by the Latin American debtors are
 such that few countries would wish to emulate their experience. Moral
 hazard can be further lessened by strict conditionality and a case-by-case
 approach to debt reduction. He rejects the voluntary approach to debt
 reduction on the grounds that debtors cannot bargain effectively in a
 situation where creditor governments tilt the balance of power in favor of
 the banks by favoring stiff sanctions against any unilateral actions by
 debtors to reduce debt service and by indirectly bailing out the banks.
 Sachs comments, "As soon as the commercial banks recognize that the
 official community is accepting the buildup of arrears by the debtor
 country, they will be much more disposed to search for long-term solu-
 tions to the debt" (p. 30). He also turns Williamson's free-rider argument
 on its head, countering that a comprehensive debt-reduction scheme is
 necessary to avoid the incentive for each individual creditor to refuse debt
 relief even though it is in the collective interest of creditors to grant relief.
 Sachs points out that domestic bankruptcy proceedings are a form of
 concerted debt reduction, which imposes an orderly settlement among
 creditors precisely to avoid the free-rider problem.
 Sachs endorses the creation of an international debt facility to
 purchase debt at a discount. He stresses that such an agency need not
 involve a large outlay of funds from the public as long as it buys the debt at
 prices close to the secondary market discount. The international debt
 facility might even turn a profit to the extent that it would be able to
 capture some of the efficiency gains from reducing the debt overhang. The
 amount directly subscribed by individual creditor governments would be
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 very small, particularly if the international debt facility is allowed to
 borrow a substantial portion of its funds in the open market (like the
 World Bank). Taxpayers would still face a contingent liability if the inter-
 national debt facility loses money, but according to Sachs, a well-run
 international debt facility should be profitable. He nevertheless seems to
 neglect some of the operational and political difficulties in establishing
 and running such an international debt facility, which Williamson has
 stressed. Sachs's arguments for direct public subsidies for debt relief and,
 most important, a changed stance by creditor governments have been
 partially adopted in the Brady Plan, even though a de jure international
 debt facility has not been established. Sachs's approach has the merit of
 distributing the burden of adjustment more evenly and transparently
 than others in which subsidies are often disguised, as in official lending.
 Against Sachs's approach, it could be argued that the banks and
 countries should arrive at debt reduction on their own, without direct or
 indirect public subsidies, which amount to "rewarding the profligate and
 punishing the poor" (Buiter and Srinivasan 1987). Yet all the books re-
 viewed here recognize the major role played by mismanagement of mac-
 roeconomic policies in the developed countries in instigating the crisis.
 The laissez-faire argument ignores the point that the taxpayers of the
 creditor countries elected their governments and are therefore ultimately
 responsible for these administrations' mistakes. It also ignores the point
 that citizens in the rich countries, especially in the United States, stand to
 gain from recovery in Latin America.
 Direct Investment
 In the long run, it still makes sense for countries with growth
 opportunities to obtain capital from abroad. The consequence is a re-
 newed interest in direct investment, both because inflows of portfolio
 capital are unlikely to resume on a large scale and because of the per-
 ceived advantages of direct investment. The possible advantages of direct
 investment over loans are twofold: direct investment provides risk shar-
 ing by the creditor (in bad times, dividends can be lowered), in contrast
 with contractually fixed interest rates for loans; and direct investment can
 provide valuable complementary inputs such as technology and manage-
 ment. Direct investment can have political and economic drawbacks too,
 such as reduction in economic sovereignty and possible distortions in-
 duced by multinational corporations (for example, such as anticompeti-
 tive practices and deceptive advertising).
 Two conference volumes focus on the role of foreign direct invest-
 ment in indebted developing countries: -Foreign Investment, Debt, and Eco-
 nomic Growth in Latin America, edited by Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar
 Carrillo, and Rekindling Development: Multinational Firms and World Debt,
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 edited by Lee Tavis. Unfortunately, the contributions to both these vol-
 umes are highly erratic in quality, most of them having little or nothing to
 do with the ostensible topic of the conferences. In Rekindling Development,
 only one essay deals with the relationship between direct investment and
 debt, a very useful contribution by Theodore Moran. He reviews the
 empirical evidence on multinational corporations and development and
 concludes that they tend to be beneficial when not sheltered from competi-
 tion. Moran notes further that prior to the debt crisis, many developing
 countries were becoming more adept in their bargaining with multina-
 tional corporations. In view of the shortage of foreign capital in the wake
 of the debt crisis, Moran worries that many debtor countries have become
 overeager to attract such corporations and have retrogressed in their
 bargaining tactics. He sees as particularly dangerous the increased will-
 ingness to grant market exclusivity. Such an arrangement is appealing
 from a myopic point of view because it benefits the firm greatly and is off-
 budget to the government. The elimination of competition is extremely
 unwise, however. Instead of market exclusivity, Moran recommends ag-
 gressive efforts to attract initial entrants through subsidies and encour-
 agement of subsequent competition. In the same volume, Paul Streeten
 discusses new forms of unbundling and joint ventures but makes no
 attempt to relate them to the particular situation of indebted countries.
 The other contributions, none of which are particularly original or in-
 formative, deal with various aspects of the debt crisis throughout the
 world.
 Foreign Investment, Debt, and Economic Growth explicitly states its
 purpose as analyzing "the role foreign investment can play in the reactiva-
 tion of the economies of the region" (p. 3). Most of the contributions have
 nothing to do with this subject, however, and some of those that do are
 weak. The volume contains interesting chapters on Central America, but
 they do not focus on the stated topic. Felipe Pazos presents a useful broad
 overview of the evolution of foreign direct investment in Latin America
 from 1950 to 1982. Helson Braga provides a thorough study of the evolu-
 tion of Brazilian policy toward foreign direct investment, arriving at an
 assessment similar to Moran's in Rekindling Development. Braga recognizes
 the positive contributions that foreign direct investment can make in
 Brazil but argues against new incentive programs and dismantling reg-
 ulations under the pressure of the debt crisis. Andres Passicot's essay on
 the Chilean case discusses informatively the effects of the open-door
 policy toward foreign direct investment under General Augusto Pino-
 chet. Despite the removal of nearly all restrictions, foreign direct invest-
 ment inflows in Chile increased only slightly between 1974 and 1983 as
 compared with 1960 to 1971. Passicot ascribes this low responsiveness to
 three causes: a preference by foreign investors for debt rather than equity
 during most of the period, long memories of the less hospitable environ-
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 ment of the past and questions about the sustainability of the Pinochet
 policies, and the serious recession in Chile during much of the period.
 Joel Bergsman and Wayne Edisis focus on a narrower set of ques-
 tions in Debt-Equity Swaps and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America.
 They do not assess the desirability of foreign direct investment, which
 they take for granted, or even the full effects of swaps. Their modest
 objective is to understand some aspects of debt-equity swaps, particularly
 the issue of additionality-that is, whether the subsidies associated with
 swaps lead to increases in foreign direct investment or merely represent
 windfalls for investors who planned to undertake investment in the
 absence of the swap programs. Bergsman and Edisis also examine the
 extent to which the secondary market discount on the debt is captured by
 the debtor government or the foreign investor and the related question of
 the magnitude of the subsidy implicit in the swap. Much of the analysis is
 based on data obtained from interviews with investors who made use of
 swaps in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
 Bergsman and Edisis provide useful information and analysis of
 the implicit subsidy provided to investors. They find that investors reaped
 from 31 to 66 percent of the secondary market discount on the debt,
 amounting to effective subsidies of 25 to 50 percent. Unfortunately, their
 analysis of additionality is incomplete at best. To determine additionality,
 Bergsman and Edisis asked the investors whether they would have carried
 out the investment without the swap programs. Using this method, they
 determined that 100 percent of foreign direct investment by banks was
 additional, while 33 percent of foreign direct investment by nonbanks was
 fully additional with another 10 percent being partially additional. The
 problem is that this concept of additionality is highly flawed from a
 macroeconomic perspective and may greatly overstate overall addition-
 ality. The reason is that other investors may have stepped in to undertake
 the investment even if the particular investor in question would have
 pulled out in the absence of the swap program. Therefore Bergsman and
 Edisis's numbers can be considered an upper bound on additionality. In
 this light, additionality by nonbanks appears very low despite the rather
 large subsidies involved, controverting the authors' cautiously optimistic
 evaluation of swaps. Another problem is that they do not address the
 larger question of whether foreign direct investment should be subsidized
 in the first place, and if so, whether swaps are the optimal way to accom-
 plish this end. As Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff (1988) have pointed
 out, debt-equity swaps are in effect debt buybacks combined with sub-
 sidies for direct investment. The merits of swaps can only be assessed by
 examining the merits of each of these two components, both of which are
 fraught with complexity.
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 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
 Latin America has compiled a long history of debt-servicing diffi-
 culties, as demonstrated by Stallings, Maddison, and Biggs. Important
 differences exist between the current crisis and past episodes, and the
 overall role of international finance in Latin American economic develop-
 ment has not been entirely negative, but it is clear that elements of
 systemic irrationality persist in Latin America's borrowing from abroad.
 Some interaction seems to occur between the shortsightedness of lenders
 and irresponsible policies in Latin America, two factors that combine to
 create fragile debt-driven booms that ultimately end in crashes when the
 external environment becomes unfavorable. While it is evident that exter-
 nal factors played an important role in fostering high levels of borrowing
 in the 1970s and then appeared to be the proximate cause of the crisis in
 the 1980s, this reviewer tends to conclude that the fundamental origins of
 the crisis are internal. Such a view also emerges from Kuczynski's work
 and especially the country studies in Sachs's edited Developing Country
 Debt and the World Economy, which document the importance of overex-
 pansionary fiscal and monetary policies and! exchange-rate misalign-
 ments. Access to international capital played a crucial role in magnifying
 the scope for policy errors by temporarily relaxing fiscal and balance of
 payments constraints.
 Economists and political scientists have increasingly attempted to
 understand the political underpinnings of economic policies as well as the
 effects of economic outcomes on politics. Stallings and Kaufman's collec-
 tion, Debt and Democracy in Latin America, is an excellent example of this
 approach. Two of the crucial political factors that emerge from Developing
 Country Debt and Debt and Democracy are the polarization among Latin
 American interest groups and the weakness of the state in mediating
 these conflicts, with the result being that economic policy becomes subor-
 dinate to conflicts over income distribution. These social conflicts tend to
 undermine orthodox as well as heterodox policies and to contribute to the
 general lack of government credibility.
 While it is evident that internal political and social conflicts under-
 lie the debt crisis and that reforms are necessary, the general consensus
 now is that the resource transfers extracted from the debtors since 1982
 have been both unfair and counterproductive in the sense of inhibiting
 long-term recovery and structural change. The historical precedents ana-
 lyzed by Biggs suggest that the pattern of adjustment in the 1980s has
 been extraordinarily favorable for creditors and equally costly to debtors.
 The case for debt relief is put forth with eloquence and conviction by
 Sachs in New Approaches to the Latin American Debt Crisis. Both Biggs and
 Sachs stress the crucial importance of the role of creditor governments in
 achieving balanced and farsighted solutions.
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 Perhaps more controversially and less well-documented, the con-
 ditionality and adjustment embodied in the orthodox IMF approach and
 the Baker and Brady plans have been distributionally unbalanced in
 forcing great hardship on the less well-to-do members of Latin American
 societies while sparing the elites. Radical perspectives like that of George,
 despite evident flaws, point out that adjustment programs are not dis-
 tributionally neutral and that alternatives to orthodoxy are possible. One
 can agree with conservative critics of Latin American economic policies
 that the role of the state in Latin America must be redirected and still
 continue to favor an important role for government. Despite the continu-
 ing setbacks, Debt and Democracy in Latin America offers some hope that the
 new democracies in the region can acquire the legitimacy and competence
 that will enable them to foster greater efficiency as well as equity.
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